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MIRACLES AND THE LAWS OF NATURE 
George I. Mavrodes 
Construing miracles as "violations," I argue that a law of nature must specify some 
kind of possibility. But we must have here a sense of possibility for which the ancient 
rule of logic-ab esse ad posse valet consequentia--does not hold. We already have one 
example associated with the concept of statute law, a law which specifies what is legally 
possible but which is not destroyed by a violation. If laws of nature are construed as 
specifying some analogous sense of what i:; naturally possible, then they need not be 
invalidated by a (rare) violation, and Humean miracles remain a genuine possibility. 
Some people, as you know, claim that miracles have actually occurred, they 
are a real part of the history of the world, just like the more ordinary wars, 
marriages, and inventions which figure in our history books. Christians, for 
example, characteristically claim that Jesus was a real historical man, and that 
he actually did some miracles. These claims generate a considerable range of 
philosophical questions and puzzles. 
On one hand, there are the questions which are primarily epistemological. For 
example, what would be a satisfactory sort of evidence that a miracle had actually 
occurred? What sort of evidence do we have in fact for the reality of miracles? 
And, going in the other epistemological direction, what would a miracle be 
evidence for? What sort of religious position or doctrine could be established or 
supported by reference to a miracle? And so on. For the most part I will ignore 
questions of this epistemological variety in this paper. 
There are also questions, however, which call directly for an analysis or 
clarification of the concept of a miracle. Just what are Christians claiming, for 
example, when they say that Jesus performed miracles? Were all of his acts 
miracles? If not, how are the allegedly miraculous acts supposed to differ from 
the others? And what must the world be like if an act or event of that sort is to 
be possible? These questions appear to combine a metaphysical concern with a 
desire for a better understanding of a suggestive and problematic concept. In 
this paper I try to follow out one such line of questioning. 
More specifically, I want to explore to some degree the ways in which the 
concepts of the miraculous and of a law of nature react on one another. And I 
will also be speculating about what sorts of laws of nature the world must have 
if miracles are to be a genuine possibility in it. 
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Our inquiry can begin with David Hume' s famous discussion which has gen-
erated so many responses and continuations. In that discussion Hume put forward 
what is probably the most influential philosophical definition of "miracle" ever 
given: 
A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of 
nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of 
some invisible agent. I 
This definition has two parts. On the one hand, it specifies the relation of the 
miraculous act or event to the laws of nature. On the other hand, it specifies the 
relation of that event to a divine or supernatural agent. It seems to me that both 
of these elements reflect aspects of the pre-philosophical way in which miracles 
are construed, at least in Christian contexts. 
One of these pre-philosophical elements is that the miracle is something which 
would not have happened-indeed, which could not have happened-in the 
ordinary course of events. It strikes the observor, the observor who recognizes 
it as a miracle, as being somehow a break in the structure of the world. It need 
not, of course, be an unwelcome break. It may well be recognized, as C.S. 
Lewis suggests, as a break which isfitting, appropriate to the situation in which 
it occurs.' But it is seen as something which does not "naturally" belong to that 
situation. 
In one of the Gospels, for example, it is said that Jesus was a guest at a 
wedding party in which the supply of wine was unexpectedly exhausted. He 
asked the servants to fill several jugs with water, and then immediately had them 
serve a sample of this drink to the master of the feast. That worthy gentleman 
found it to be wine of a better quality than had been originally provided. 3 
Apparently the water had been converted, more or less instantaneously, into 
wine. Regardless of whether we believe this story to be true most of us, I think, 
will recognize it as belonging to a different genre than a story about someone 
who sends a servant out to buy some more wine from the local supplier. 
One way of trying to formulate this difference-but it is only an initial approx-
imation-is to say that this act, like the healings, the raising of Lazarus from 
the dead, and so on, is hard. Not everyone could do it. There is, as it were, a 
resistance in things against events of this sort, and it requires a special power 
to accomplish them. No doubt this power is sometimes construed simply as a 
force which coerces things into a course which they would not otherwise follow. 
But sometimes in the Gospels there seems to me to be a different suggestion, a 
construal of the requisite power not as a force but as an authority. This distinction, 
however, is not one we can follow out here. 
That the miraculous act is hard to do is, of course, not exactly the right thing 
to say. It apparently is not hard in just the same way in which it is hard to run 
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a mile in four minutes, and it does not require special powers in the same way 
as breaking an Olympic record requires unusual strength, endurance, and skill. 
We are tempted to say that it is even harder than that. But of course that is not 
quite right either. Maybe Hume's way of putting it, in terms of laws of nature, 
is more illuminating. At any rate, once we have the concept of a law of nature-
once it seems to us that we can say something penetrating and revealing about 
the world by using that notion-then it also seems natural to try to explain the 
special character of the miraculous in those terms. That is the project which I 
want to explore in this paper. 
Whether we can illuminate the idea of the miraculous, however, by means of 
the concept of the laws of nature will presumably depend on what the content 
of that latter concept is. It may be that the idea of a law of nature was first 
introduced in the West by thinkers operating more or less within a Christian 
framework of thought. But for several hundred years now that idea has been 
developed and applied in a largely secular way, without much concern for its 
religious connections. Does it still connect usefully with the religious concept 
of the miraculous? 
Before we get into that, however, let us return to the pre-philosophical context 
for a moment to notice that the second element in it, that of the miracle's being 
the act of a special agent, is closely connected there with the first. We may try 
to get across a sense of the special character of the miraculous act by saying, 
as I did above, that not everyone could do it-it must take a very special sort 
of person to convert water into wine, to calm a storm by speaking to it, to call 
the dead from the grave, and so on. But of course we might also try to convey 
a sense of the special character of the person by reference (in part) to the 
miraculous acts which he did. Jesus, that is, must be a very special sort of man 
because he could, and did, raise the dead, etc. At the pre-philosophical stage, 
then, the two elements which appear in Hume's analysis are closely inter-twined. 
Perhaps we wish (is it for the sake of clarity?) that they could be separated. 
In Hume's analysis itself, it seems to me, they are separated. Hume conjoins 
these elements, of course. Nothing will count as a Humean miracle unless it is 
both a violation of a law of nature and the action of a divine agent. But, so far 
as I can see, Hume leaves this conjunction as possibly purely external. He 
suggests no internal connection between these concepts. If we take his analysis 
seriously, therefore, we can ask whether it is possible that there is an event 
which satisfies one-half of the analysis but not the other. Could there be, for 
example, an event which was a violation of a law of nature, but which was not 
(in any special way, at least) an act of God? Such an event would not, of course, 
be a Humean miracle. But could such an event occur? Do such events occur? 
Do we have a special name for them? And on the other hand, could there be an 
act of God-in a sense, that is, in which not everything is an act of God-which 
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was not a violation of a law of nature? 
Though I mention these questions here, I will have only a little to say about 
them in this paper. Like most of the discussions growing outofHume's analysis-
indeed, like Hume's own discussion-mine here will focus mainly on the first 
element in his definition, the relation of the miraculous to the laws of nature. 
And I begin with what seems to me to be a powerful objection to the reality of 
Humean miracles. 
The objection of which I am thinking is put by Alastair McKinnon, for example, 
in this way: 
The idea of a suspension of natural law is self-contradictory. This 
follows from the meaning of the term ... [Natural laws] are simply highly 
generalized shorthand descriptions of how things do in fact happen ... . 
Hence there can be no suspensions of natural law rightly understood ... . 
Once we understand natural law in this proper sense we see that such 
a law, as distinct from our conception of it, is inherently inviolable. 
Hence anything which happens, even an apparent miracle, happens 
according to law.... This contradiction may stand out more clearly if 
for natural law we substitute the expression the actual course of events. 
Miracle would then be defined as "an event involving the suspension 
of the actual course of events." And someone who insisted upon 
describing an event as a miracle would be in the rather odd position of 
claiming that its occurrence was contrary to the actual course of events. 4 
McKinnon, as we see, holds that it is not logically possible that an event 
satisfy the first part of Hume's analysis-i.e., it is not logically possible that 
there be an event which is a violation of a law of nature. And why would miracles 
be logically impossible? It is because a law of nature does not aIJow-that is, 
it logically does not allow--4)f any violations. 
I said earlier that miracles may be thought of as being hard to do, and as 
requiring special powers. The objection we are now considering does not proceed, 
however, by construing the laws of nature themselves as being so resistant as 
to surpass any counter-vailing power. McKinnon, in fact, says explicitly that 
laws of nature "exert no opposition or resistance to anything, not even to the 
odd or exceptional. "5 No, it is simply that the laws of nature are being construed 
either as invariant regularities in the natural world or else as the statements which 
express, or assert the occurrence of, such regularities. As McKinnon puts it, 
they are just generalized descriptions of the actual course of events, no matter 
what those events happen to be. 
If we construe a law of nature in this way, then the proposition which corres-
ponds to a law of nature will have the form of a universal generalization. The 
alleged violation, on the other hand, will presumably be a particular event-some-
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thing like the conversion of the water into wine or the raising of Lazarus from 
the dead. The corresponding proposition will be either a singular proposition or 
an existential generalization. And now what is the logical relation of this prop-
osition to the universal generalization which corresponds to the law of nature? 
Well, if these two propositions are logically compatible then evidently the 
particular event is compatible with the invariant regularity. But in that case it is 
not a violation of that regularity, and hence it is not a Humean miracle. If, on 
the other hand, the two propositions are logically incompatible, then it is not 
logically possible that they should both be true. If it is the proposition asserting 
the occurrence of the particular event which is false, then that event did not 
occur. There has therefore been (so far, at least) no miracle. If, on the other 
hand, it is the universal generalization which is false, then the world does not 
in fact contain the corresponding invariant regularity. But (on this view) that 
amounts to saying that the world does not contain that law of nature after all. 
It was at best merely an apparent law of nature, what was thought to be a law 
of nature, or some such thing. But since the regularity was not in fact invariant 
it did not constitute a genuine law. Hence there has been no violation of a genuine 
law, and so again there has been no genuine Humean miracle. 
Every possibility, therefore, seems to lead to the same result. No Humean 
miracle has occurred. And therefore, it would seem, no such miracle is possible. 
Put somewhat picturesquely, this view of things claims that either the alleged 
event can co-exist peacefully with the regUlarity or else it must kill the regularity, 
showing it to be a sham. In neither case is there a genuine violation of a genuine 
regularity, and therefore in neither case is there a genuine miracle. 
As I said, this seems to me to involve a powerful and significant objection, 
but in the way in which it has been put here it invites an easy reply. We can 
begin by observing that the conclusion which we have attributed to the objector 
need not be greatly disturbing to any religious person or any "friend of miracles." 
Nothing that the objector has said tends to show at all, or to make it in any way 
probable, that Jesus did not turn water into wine, that he did not calm a storm 
with a word or raise Lazarus from the dead, and so on. Nor does it tend to show 
that these events did not have a profound religious significance. It does not even 
tend to show that these things, if they happened, were not miracles. At most 
(for better or worse) it tends to show that they are not Humean miracles. That 
is, if the objector is right in this argument, then the friend of miracles cannot 
use Hume's analysis to elucidate the concept of a miracle. Either he must leave 
that concept in its somewhat inchoatr. pre-philosophical condition, or he must 
find some illuminating alternative to Hume's suggestion. The concept of natural 
law which is adopted by McKinnon, then, is not helpful to the friend of miracles, 
but neither is it damaging to him. It simply turns out to be pretty much irrelevant 
to the topic of miracles. 
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We need not, it seems to me, think that it must be a great tragedy if the 
concept of natural law turns out not to be very useful in explaining the concept 
of a miracle. After all, we have lots of concepts which are not closely connected 
with the miraculous. And we might well be able to find some other useful way 
of analyzing and explaining what a miracle is. In this paper, however, I am 
continuing to explore what we can do with laws of nature in this connection. 
As I say, we can observe that McKinnon's claim here need not be disturbing 
to the friend of miracles. Perhaps more fruitful, however, would be the observa-
tion that this objection itself relies on an unsatisfactory conception of a law of 
nature, or at least one which is widely thought to be unsatisfactory. If a law of 
nature is simply an invariant regularity then we do not provide for a distinction 
in this connection between those regularities which are accidental and those 
which are somehow more deeply rooted in the nature of things. Put in the more 
formal mode of speech, it is often pointed out that some universal generalizations 
seem to entail a corresponding set of counter-factual hypotheticals, while other 
generalizations do not. It may be true, for example, that everyone here today is 
aU. S. citizen. But even if this is true it does not seem to imply that if Margaret 
Thatcher were here today then she would be a U.S. citizen. Ifit is true, however, 
that all masses attract each other according to Newton's formula, then that would 
seem to imply that if I were wearing a massive helmet right now then it would 
be attracted by the earth. Generalizations of the latter sort are often called 
nomological or law-like, and the other sort are the accidentals. And it is rather 
commonly held that it is only the nomological generalizations which represent, 
or correspond to, laws of nature. And if that is correct, then McKinnon's account 
here is defective. 
We may note in passing, however, that ignoring this distinction, as McKinnon 
appears to do, makes much more plausible something else that McKinnon holds. 
He says that scientists "assume that all events are law-like (whatever that really 
means) or, at least, that they must be treated as such. They assume that every 
event can be shown to be an instance of some generalization, whether simple 
or statistical. This is why the scientist holds that there are no suspensions of 
natural law."6 
Now, it is a fact that if we place no restriction on the type of generalization 
which is allowable, then every event, no matter how bizarre and anomalous it 
may be, will be subsumable under some generalization. This is like the fact that 
no matter how randomly a set of points may be distributed on a graph, there is 
some line which can be drawn through them. Given, then, what appears to be 
McKinnon's version of a law of nature, what is here ascribed to the scientist as 
an "assumption" turns out to be a necessary truth. 
If, however, we restrict the relevant generalizations to those which are 
nomological, and perhaps also (as Richard Swinburne does) to those which are 
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relatively simple, then it is not at all clear that all events are subsumable in this 
way.7 And if some scientists do assume that this is the case, as McKinnon says, 
then we might well ask them what has led them to this curious assumption. 
Returning now to our main line of inquiry, I will proceed on the supposition 
that the nomologicallaccidental distinction is an important one for our concept 
of a law of nature. The notion of a nomological is, of course, not perfectly clear 
itself. I don't have much that is illuminating to say about it right here, though 
I will have one further suggestion later on. For the time being let me just observe 
that I find a suggestion of R. F. Holland attractive in this connection. Objecting 
to the view that a law of nature is just a description, Holland says that "the law 
tells us, defines for us, what is and is not possible ... "8 And he goes on to say 
that a law of nature, like a legal law, "stipulates" something. And this suggests 
that the formal representation of such a law will be a universal generalization 
with the modality of necessity. 
Adopting this suggestion however, as I propose to do, seems to re-instate 
McKinnon's objection, perhaps now in a less vulnerable form. For the singular 
statement, "This A is not Boo seems to be incompatible with "Necessarily, every 
A is Boo just as it is with the unmodalized "Every A is B." And so must it not 
again be the case that every actual event which apparently violates a law of 
nature really only shows that this was not a genuine law after all, since the 
modalized generalization is shown to be false by the counter-example to it? 
Holland's own solution to this difficulty is to propose that we reject "that 
time-honored logical principle," ab esse ad possee valet consequentia. 9 And this 
is equivalent to rejecting a stock theorem of modal logic to the effect that 
Necessary p entails p. 
That proposal does seem to solve the difficulty. If "Necessarily, every A is 
B" does not entail "Every A is B," then "This A is not Boo does not seem to be 
incompatible with the modalized statement. And consequently, it would seem, 
both the law-like "Necessarily, every A is B" and the anomalous singular state-
ment "This A is not B" may be true together. And so, if we can swallow Holland's 
proposal, we need not take the violation to invalidate the putative law. 
What, however, becomes of the idea of violation here? If the singular statement 
is not incompatible with the law-like, modalized, generalization, then how does 
the singular statement represent a violation of the corresponding law? I think 
that we can answer this question. We can introduce the expression, "the formal 
content of P ," where P is a modalized proposition, to refer to whatever proposition 
follows the (first) modal operator in P. Thus, the formal content of "Necessarily, 
every A is B" will be simply "Every A is B." The "time-honored principle" 
which Holland proposes to reject says that every necessary proposition entails 
its own formal content. But even if we follow Holland in rejecting this entailment, 
we can still recognize that the formal content of a necessary proposition bears 
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a special and intimate relation to that proposition. We can therefore say that, 
where L represents a law of nature and P represents an event, then P represents 
a violation of L IFF P is logically incompatible with the formal content of L. 
Well, this would seem to give us a usable notion of a violation of a law of 
nature, but perhaps the price seems too high. If we must reject a standard theorem 
of modal logic in order to retain the idea of a violation would it not be better 
to give up on that idea, give up on Hume's definition, and look for some other 
way of explaining what a miracle is? After all, if "necessarily, p" does not entail 
"p," then what will be left of modal logic at all? 
Well, I think that there is something to this reaction, alright, but it need not 
be conclusive. We do need to recognize, I think, that Holland's way of putting 
the thing is unnecessarily paradoxical. He speaks of rejecting the time-honored 
principle. (Curiously, he also speaks of accepting "a contradiction in our experi-
ence. "10 But the effect of rejecting the time-honored principle is precisely to 
prevent the miracle from being contradictory to the law.) But nothing in the 
situation requires us to reject that principle in general. The most that we need 
along this line is to find some sort of necessity for which the principle does not 
hold. If we could ascribe that sort of necessity to the laws of nature, then we 
would be in a position to recognize violations of those laws. But we would not 
need to deny that the time-honored principle of logic still held for other sorts of 
necessity, for example for logical necessity. 
Now, it is a curious and significant fact that we seem already to have at hand, 
and in common use, a sense of necessity which has just this feature. It is a sort 
of necessity for which the time-honored principle does not hold, one in which 
the fact that something is necessary does not entail that the thing actually happens. 
And where do we find this sort of necessity? Well, one place is in the law-not 
a law of nature now, but the sort of law that legislatures enact and which courts 
enforce, what I will call legal law. In that sort of law there is a necessity for 
which "necessarily, p" does not entail "p." 
One common way to express a legal law is simply as a universal generalization, 
something like "Every resident having an annual income over $1,000 shall file 
a return by April 15 .... " etc. Of course, there must be something in the context 
that indicates that the generalization is to be taken as a law. The fact that the 
generalization was adopted by a state legislature, for example, would perform 
that function. Given that context, however, the universal generalization expresses 
a legal law. 
Now, this legal law seems to invite just the sort of observations which Holland 
makes about the laws of nature. The legal law is not simply a description of 
actual regularities in human behavior. Rather, it defines or stipulates a certain 
sort of possibility-it tells us what is legally possible and impossible. And, of 
course, the law admits of violations. That is, it provides a context or background 
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against which the idea of a violation makes sense and furthermore, the actuality 
of a violation does not invalidate the law. Though the violation is a violation 
precisely in virtue of its contrariety to the law, nevertheless both the law and its 
violation can co-exist. 
We can, of course, imagine someone's making the analogue of McKinnon's 
objection. Observing that someone has not filed a return, he would point out 
that this fact is logically incompatible with the truth of the universal generaliza-
tion. The generalization must therefore be false. And how, he may ask, could 
a false generalization express a true and valid law? 
In the case of the legal law, however, we recognize this objection to be 
misdirected. A person who makes such an objection to the propriety of the 
alleged law betrays his misunderstanding of what a legal law amounts to. 
Though legal laws are often expressed simply as categorical generalizations 
sometimes the modal element in them is made more explicit by the inclusion in 
them of some modal expression. "All residents must file a return .... " Here the 
necessity seems to be open, on the surface of the expression. But it is a necessity 
for which the time-honored principle does not hold. A McKinnon-type objection 
to the validity of this law would again be misdirected. 
Perhaps this point should be made more carefully. We can begin by observing 
that there is a sense in which expressions like 
(1) Mr. N,a resident, etc., did not file a return. 
can be taken as representing or reporting a fact about the world, an actual event, 
etc. And there is a sense in which 
(2) All residents, etc., will file a return. 
can be understood as a generalization which is logically incompatible with (1). 
(2), for example, might be a prediction made by a fortune teller or a political 
scientist. In that case, (1), if true, would show (2) to be false. 
If legislature, however, were to adopt a sentence identical with the one which 
appears in (2) (doing so in the prescribed way, etc.) then it would not be asserting 
the proposition asserted in (2). The legislature would not be committing itself 
to something which was logically incompatible with (1). We could say that the 
legislature was adopting a nomic generalization. 
(2N) All residents, etc., will file a return. 
And this nomic generalization, though it uses the same sentence as (2), is not 
logically incompatible with (1). That is why a McKinnon-type objection fails. 
It confuses (2N) with (2). 
In a similar way we need to distinguish 
(3) Necessarily, all residents will file ... 
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from its nomic analogue, (3N), which might be expressed using the same sentence 
or a similar one. There are some sorts of necessity-logical necessity, for exam-
ple,-for which (3) entails (2), and for which, therefore, (3) is logically incom-
patible with (1). In order to understand the law we do not need to deny that 
there are such types of necessity, nor need we entertain any doubt about that 
entailment. (3N), however, does not involve that sort of necessity. Perhaps (3N) 
entails (2N) (though I suspect that they are identical), but it does not entail (2). 
And therefore it is not logically incompatible with (1). 
Earlier, I defined the expression, "the formal content of P," where P was a 
mod ali zed expression. We should now revise this definition. The formal content 
of (3N) should not be taken to be (2N). It is, rather, simply (2). I.e., the formal 
content of a modalized proposition is the non-nomic analogue of the proposition 
which follows the (first) modal operator. We can then explain the notion of a 
violation just as before. Since (1) is logically incompatible with (2), the formal 
content of (3N), it is a violation of (3N). 
Legal laws are not logically incompatible with their violations, and are not 
invalidated by their violations. It does not follow, of course, that legal laws have 
no bearing on human behavior. In some societies at least, the fact that something 
was legally necessary would be a good reason for expecting the thing to happen, 
and the fact that an alleged event was legally impossible would be a good reason 
for suspecting that the event did not really happen. And we could also go in the 
other direction. If we could not discover the legal laws of that society "directly," 
e. g., by reading the law books, then we might attempt to determine them induc-
tively, by generalizing from observed behavior. If we noticed a lot of people 
rushing to the post office to file tax returns on April 15, for example, we might 
forn1 the hypothesis that this date was specified by a law. We might go on to 
test this hypothesis further, coming to think, perhaps, that it was not exactly 
accurate, refining it to include a provision for automatic extension, and so on, 
until we came to some formulation as our best guess, subject, of course, to 
future correction, of one of the laws underlying the behavior of that society. 
Well, we have had a long excursion into the law, the legal law, that is. Can 
we return to the laws of nature? I know that it is often said that the laws of 
nature are not at all like legal laws, that it is an anthropomorphic fallacy to think 
that they are similar, and so on. This is repeated so often, it seems to me, that 
perhaps we should take it to be the currently received doctrine on the subject. 
Must we therefore also take it to be true? I guess that I am not now ready to do 
so. For one thing, despite this alleged complete dissimilarity it has apparently 
been natural for hundreds of years, right down to the present, to use the very 
same word, "law," for both of these cases. That strikes me as significant, 
suggesting that there has been a long and persistent recognition of important 
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structural similarities. Nor need we be completely vague about what those 
similarities are. We have just been noticing some of them, at least, in the last 
few minutes. I suspect that our long practice in the West of using the same 
terminology for legal laws and laws of nature has a substantial foundation in the 
nature of the phenomena which are being discussed. 
At any rate, we do not seem to be at a loss for a sense of necessity, already 
in hand, which allows for violations. If we were to construe the laws of nature 
as having that sort of necessity, or some similar sort, then it would seem possible 
for there to be events which satisfy the first part of Hume's definition. That 
concept of a law of nature seems to promise some utility in explaining what a 
miracle is. 
Well, I suppose that we can have one concept or another. Is that all there is 
to it? One feels like saying that there must be more. What idea of the laws of 
nature actually fits the world? What sort of laws are there, "out there"? I don't 
know that I can say much that is illuminating about this. Let me close, however, 
with one observation. Much contemporary discussion of this sort of topic by 
contemporary philosophers of science leaves us, I think, in an unsatisfactory 
position. I mentioned, early on in this paper, the distinction between accidental 
and nomological generalizations. Well and good; there does seem to be such a 
distinction. Some of these propositions support the corresponding counter-factuals 
and others do not. But why is that? It doesn't seem as though it could be due 
to a difference in the surface grammar of these statements, since at that level 
they are the same, simply universal generalizations. Maybe, however, it can be 
said that these propositions are to be understood in different ways. One of them 
is to be taken "simply" as a generalization, entailing only those instantiations 
which fall under it in the actual world. The other, however, is intended to be 
taken as a law. I.e., it is intended to be understood as entailing not only its 
actual instantiations but also the counter-factuals. So it covers not only the actual 
world but also a range of possible worlds. And I, at least, suppose that some 
account like this is probably true. 
What happens, however, if we insist on understanding the so-called accidental 
as if it were a nomological? I.e., we understand it to entail the corresponding 
counter-factuals, or at least to support them. Well, presumably what happens in 
that case is that it just turns out to be false. Understood as nomological, the 
statement "Everyone here is a citizen of the U.S." is just false. There is simply 
no such law of nature. But what is it that makes this proposition, interpreted 
nomic ally , false? Well, perhaps it is the fact that it entails a proposition such as 
"If Margaret Thatcher were here today she would be a U.S. citizen." And that 
counter-factual proposition is false. 
Well, perhaps that is why the generalization, interpreted nomically, is false. 
But that, of course, invites us to ask why this counter-factual is false, while the 
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counter-factual which asserts that if I were wearing a helmet it would be attracted 
by the earth it true. One is tempted to say that one of these is true and the other 
is false because there is a law of nature which governs the attraction of the 
helmet and the earth, while there is no law of nature connecting presence in this 
hall with U.S. citizenship. That, no doubt, is true. But we began this series of 
questions by trying to understand the difference between the propositions which 
express laws of nature and those which express universal, but accidental, generali-
zations. If the present claim, therefore, that there is a law of nature concerning 
the attraction of the helmet to the earth is to be illuminating in this connection 
the reference here to a law of nature can't be understood to be simply a reference 
to some proposition. It must rather be taken as a reference to some element of 
the actual world. We must be asserting that some propositions, understood 
nomically, actually connect with some feature or aspect of reality, while others, 
if they are taken in the nomic sense, do not. That is what makes some of them 
true and others false. The laws of nature, then, will be actual features of the 
real world. We cannot generate or produce a law of nature simply by formulating 
the corresponding proposition, nor by understanding it in the nomological way. 
For if we do understand, for example, the proposition about U.S. citizenship in 
this way, then we do not make it into a law of nature. We simply convert it into 
a falsehood. 
Now, we may of course still be somewhat puzzled to know exactly what sort 
of features of the world a law of nature is. It does not appear to be a physical 
object. Perhaps it is more like a relation. But it is apparently not a spatial relation, 
not a temporal relation, and so on. Nor can it be the relation (if any) which is 
expressed by an ordinary universal generalization. For if it were then every such 
true generalization would express a law of nature. At least one striking oddity 
about it is that if it is a relation, then it relates non-existent things just as well 
as existent things. In order to generate the counter-factuals it has to govern the 
non-existent helmet which I might be wearing but am not, just as well as it 
governs the existing shoes which I am actually wearing. 
Now, some of the things which David Hume says in connection with the idea 
of causality might be interpreted as maintaining that this alleged relation is not 
a perceptual object. II We have no sense impression of it. Consequently, the 
alleged concept of this relation does not refer to any such impression or to the 
residue of any impression. Consequently, there is no genuine idea there. The 
words which we use in this connection are merely words~mpty sounds. We 
cannot, therefore, have any genuine assertions or denials involving it. If we do 
interpret Hume in this way then either the common distinction between accidental 
and nomological generalizations is vacuous, or else Humean theory itself is 
mistaken. And if it is mistaken, then either we do have an impression of this 
relation after all, or else it is possible to have a genuine concept without having 
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the corresponding impression. I am strongly inclined to think that the accidental! 
nomological distinction is valid and important, and consequently I think that the 
theory which I have tentatively attributed to Hume is mistaken. But I do not 
right now have any strong leaning toward locating the mistake in one rather than 
the other of its two possible locations. 
We might still feel, of course, that we don't yet have a full idea of just what 
relation this is. I don't know that I can now go much further with this. I'm 
inclined to try one further step, using the ideas of a "power." I'm not fully 
confident of it. You can try it yourself and see whether you come up with 
something better. I'm somewhat attracted by the idea that the laws of nature 
reflect powers which are somehow embedded in reality, powers which run along 
certain lines, we might say, and not along others. There is perhaps a power 
which "seizes," so to speak, upon objects which are close to one another, and 
which then, impels them toward one another. If there is such a power, then it 
would be what the law of gravity amounts to. There is, on the other hand, no 
deep power in nature which seizes upon people who enter this hall, and impels 
them into U.S. citizenship. The absence of such a power, then, would explain 
why the fact that everyone here is a U.S. citizen, if it is a fact, is an accidental 
rather than a nomological fact. 
Well, whatever the fate of this idea of powers may be, it seems as though if 
we take up a realistic notion of the laws of nature as being features of reality, 
features which tend to produce certain effects, then we can also think of something 
which may over-ride such a feature or negate its effect. It appears, then, that a 
realistic construal of the laws of nature provides both a distinction which is 
apparently important to the understanding of science and also an attractive way 
of explaining at least part of the concept of the miraculous. 
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